An interview with the editors of Treated Like a Child: Age Discrimination and Children's Rights
Our members, Professors Aoife Daly (University College Cork, Ireland), Pernilla Leviner (Stockholm University, Sweden), and Rebecca Thorburn Stern (Uppsala University, Sweden), talk about their edited collection, Treated Like a Child: Age Discrimination and Children's Rights (Brill, 2025).
Q: What is this edited collection about?
The principle of non-discrimination is a fundamental tenet of human rights law and one of the core principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), as stated in Article 2. However, the principle of non-discrimination does not guarantee that differential treatment with negative consequences for specific individuals or groups will not occur, nor that such treatment will be questioned or regarded as problematic. A case in point is children, who are subject to numerous forms of differential treatment compared with adults, many of which are intended to serve the child’s best interests and are motivated by children’s vulnerability and evolving capacities, but which can also, in many situations, have adverse effects.
The aim of this edited volume is to bring much-needed analysis to the topic of non-discrimination and children’s rights from the perspective of the treatment of children as a distinct group, and to draw attention to the largely ignored potential to progress children’s rights in the framework of non-discrimination, CRC Article 2 in particular.
The contributions to this interdisciplinary volume explore both broader issues concerning discrimination against children and instances of differential treatment in specific contexts, including climate change, child labour, child protection, health care, and migration. The collection argues that greater attention to the ways in which children are treated differently – and to whether such differential treatment is justifiable – will enhance the realisation and respect of children’s rights, as well as contribute to the development of children’s rights studies.
Q: What made you initiate this volume?
This edited volume originates from the research project Treated Like a Child: Children and Age Discrimination Law in Sweden and the UK (funded by the Ragnar Söderberg Foundation, Grant ID R20/18), which was initiated in response to the limited attention given so far to discrimination against children on the basis of age and childhood, and to the largely overlooked potential for advancing children’s rights within the framework of non-discrimination in relation to children as a group. The aim of the project, and of this edited volume, is to bring a children’s rights analysis to the issue of non-discrimination, focusing on the treatment of children as a distinct group.
While the starting point of the book is legal, detrimental treatment of children is an everyday issue transcending the discipline of law. Article 2 of the CRC is clearly central when discussing children's legal rights, but focusing only on legal rights risks overlooking broader dimensions and valuable aspects of equality and non-discrimination in relation to children. The edited volume’s interdisciplinary approach is therefore motivated by the need to work across disciplines to illustrate how the field of children's rights and discrimination can be understood and analysed from different perspectives.
An excerpt from the introductory chapter (pages 1-3):
Equality and non-discrimination are essential foundations of the rule of law, as well as fundamental moral principles. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,’ and all core human rights treaties at both global and regional levels stipulate that states have an obligation to uphold the principle of non-discrimination. This includes the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Although definitions and understandings may differ when it comes to equality and non-discrimination, it is useful to note that the CRC monitoring body, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Committee) outlines that: “the general principle of non-discrimination in the Convention prohibits differences in treatment on grounds that are arbitrary and objectively unjustifiable”. It can also be said that that “[e]quality is the positive face of non-discrimination”.
The prevalence of the principle of non-discrimination does not however guarantee that differential treatment with negative consequences for specific individuals or groups does not occur. Neither does it mean that such treatment is questioned or even perceived as problematic. A case in point is children. Children – commonly defined as individuals under the age of 18 – are subject to numerous forms of differential treatment compared to adults. While such differentiation often is intended to be in the best interests of the child, motivated by children’s vulnerability and evolving capacities – minimum age requirements for criminal responsibility, consent, and marriage, as well as compulsory schooling, are a few examples – there are also numerous instances where differential treatment may have adverse effects. Examples include the lack of protection against corporal punishment, the criminalisation of certain acts only when committed by a child (status offences), limitations of political participation, restricted access to healthcare in matters concerning reproductive health, and the increasing exclusion of children from urban public spaces.
When age or childhood serves as the primary basis for treating children less favourably than adults it raises the question of whether such treatment is justifiable, legitimate and proportionate or whether it constitutes discrimination on the grounds of age – in other words, whether children are being discriminated against for being children. […]
That children are a distinct group is demonstrated not least by the fact that there is an international treaty dedicated specifically to their rights. Besson and Kleber point to the centrality of the prohibition of discrimination in the context of children’s rights, noting how “historically […] the struggle against child discrimination has been a central driving force in the development of the rights of the child”. In the CRC, the non-discrimination clause – located in the treaty’s Article 2 – plays a key role as it is one of the CRC four general principles in light of which the CRC and its individual provisions should be interpreted and implemented. Article 2 requires State Parties to “respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status” (Article 2.1). The second paragraph (Article 2.2) obliges State parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure children are protected from discrimination or punishment of the basis of status, actions, activities, opinions or beliefs of parents, legal guardians or family members. Article 2 moreover “requires States actively to identify individual children and groups of children the recognition and realization of whose rights may demand special measures” and to gather data necessary to identify discrimination taking place. The article thus creates both positive and negative obligations for State parties, requiring for States not only to refrain from discrimination of children but also to actively address and counteract measures directly or indirectly discriminating against children. The non-discrimination clause of Article 2 is, in other words, essential for the equal enjoyment of the rights established by the CRC of all children.
As can be seen above, the wording of Article 2.1 clearly relates to discrimination against children in disadvantaged groups such as ethnic or religious minorities or children with disabilities. What it does not do is to refer explicitly to the essential characteristic of any child – that is, being underage, of young age, of being in a state of childhood. Part of the explanation for this might be the fact that neither age nor childhood are explicitly mentioned among the protected grounds in other core human rights treaties on global or regional level – for a long time it was, more or less, a non-issue. The non-discrimination clauses however are open-ended in the sense that they are not limited to the grounds enumerated but also include a reference to ‘other status’. ‘Other status’ in recent years increasingly has been recognised by human rights treaty bodies as also covering age, including young age. In international jurisprudence, however, application of young age as a discrimination ground so far is limited, perhaps partly for reasons of the (mis)understanding that (young) age discrimination should be treated differently, more strictly, than discrimination on other grounds; what Vandenhole refers to as “age discrimination exceptionalism”.